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Cartesian Ontology of Thought:
Distinguishing Intellect and Will
Abstract
On the standard modal reading, Descartes maintains that there
is a modal distinction between the two main faculties of the mind:
intellect and will. Against the standard view, Alan Nelson has ar-
gued for a conceptual reading: a conceptual—not modal— distinc-
tion holds between the intellect and the will, which entails that
the intellect and will are identical. While there are interpretive
benefits to such a view, it is also a highly revisionary reading of
Descartes’ ontology of thought that threatens canonical features
of Descartes’ philosophical system. I raise three problems for this
reading that must be addressed if we are to abandon the modal
reading.
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1 Introduction
In the epistemic theodicy of the Fourth Meditation, Descartes unpacks
the general faculty of judgment referred to in the previous three med-
itations, parsing it out into two distinct faculties: the intellect and the
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will.1 The standard interpretation of the metaphysics of these faculties
is that the intellect and the will are distinct, because a modal distinc-
tion holds between them. That is, the intellect and the will are distinct
modifications or properties of the mind and are dependent on the mind
for their existence. As Descartes writes:
All the modes of thinking that we experience within our-
selves can be brought under two general headings: percep-
tion, or the operation of the intellect, and volition, or the op-
eration of the will. (Principles I.32 AT VIIIA: 17/CSM I: 204)
Call this the modal reading. However, Alan Nelson (1997) has argued
that, in fact, Descartes maintains a rational or conceptual distinction
between the intellect and the will. On Nelson’s identity reading of the
conceptual distinction, a conceptual distinction between X and Y entails
that X and Y are identical in reality. As such, Nelson claims that, for
Descartes, the intellect and the will are only theoretically distinct in
thought, but identical in reality. Call this the conceptual reading.
There are excellent systematic reasons for holding the conceptual
reading. One of the primary benefits of this view is that it does not
ascribe to Descartes an Aristotelian or Platonic style faculty psychology
that compromises his commitment to the ontological simplicity of the
mind, or as Nelson puts it, “the ontological unity of thought” (1997: 175).
As Descartes writes:
As for the faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory
perception and so on, these cannot be termed parts of the
mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, and un-
derstands and has sensory perceptions. (Sixth Meditation,
AT VII: 86/CSM II: 59)
1I employ the following abbreviations: ‘AT’: Oeuvres de Descartes (cited by volume
and page), Adam and Tannery (1996); ‘CSM’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
(cited by volume and page), Cottingham et al. (1985).
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However, the conceptual reading is highly revisionary, particularly be-
cause it makes Descartes out to be a Spinozist about belief, a point that
Nelson recognizes:
Some of the apparent strangeness of this emphasis on the on-
tological unity of thought might come from the comparison
with Spinoza whose position in his Ethics is similar to the
one I am attributing to Descartes. Spinoza’s position is more
extreme insofar as he does not see any philosophical util-
ity in theoretically distinguishing will from intellect while
Descartes thinks it very important to do so. (Ibid.)2
The conceptual reading threatens to undermine canonical features of
Descartes’ epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. In this paper, I aim
to raise three distinct problems for the conceptual reading that must be
addressed if we are to abandon the standard modal reading. First, the
conceptual reading conflicts with Descartes’ theory of error. Second, the
conceptual reading nearly collapses the distinction between finite minds
and the infinite mind (i.e. God). Third, the conceptual reading conflicts
with Descartes’ account of the moral self in his theory of generosity.
Before proceeding, I want to be clear about the potential implications
of this study. I do not aim to contest the textual evidence for Nelson’s
claim that the intellect and the will are identical. Although Nelson’s
reading is in part dependent on his account of the conceptual distinc-
tion, his claim that the intellect and the will are identical does not stand
or fall with said reading. As such, one cannot get out of the problems I
will pose by rejecting Nelson’s reading of the conceptual distinction in
favor of (say) Hoffman’s inseparability reading of the conceptual distinc-
2Cottingham (1988) has forcefully argued that there are principled differences be-
tween Descartes and Spinozas’s conceptions of the intellect and will. Nelson is reject-
ing this standard reading.
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tion.3 Indeed, Nelson has forceful evidence for the identity of the intel-
lect and will based on clear texts where Descartes collapses the meta-
physics of activity and passivity. While Nelson’s reading of the concep-
tual distinction helps make sense of this collapse, Descartes clearly does
make claims about the identity of activity and passivity that stand inde-
pendent of any reading of the conceptual distinction. My aim is merely
to show that identifying the intellect and the will generates serious ten-
sions within Descartes’ system. As such, it may turn out that Descartes’
metaphysics of the mind is deeply inconsistent with his other commitm-
ments, but I will not attempt to establish or resolve said inconsistencies
here.
At the same time, however, a conclusion of this paper will be that the
modal reading offers, on balance, a better explanation of the texts, for
it doesn’t generate the tensions that the conceptual reading generates.
Admittedly, the modal reading does conflict with texts where Descartes
identifies activity with passivity, but still—on balance—it should be
preferred to the conceptual reading (unless advocates of the conceptual
reading find a way out of the three problems I identify).
2 The Conceptual Reading
Descartes gives us the following account of the conceptual distinction:
[A] conceptual distinction is a distinction between a substance
and some attribute of that substance without which the sub-
stance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction be-
3According to Hoffman, a conceptual distinction between X and Y does not entail
identity but rather inseparability: “It could be interpreted weakly to mean that A and
B are inseparable outside of thought. That is, when Descartes says things are distinct
he means that they are separable. So things that are in no way distinct outside of
thought would be in no way separable outside of thought. But they need notbe identi-
cal” (2002:61).
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tween two such attributes of a single substance. (Principles
I.62 AT VIIIA: 30/CSM I: 214; emphasis added)
Following Nolan’s (1997) reading of the conceptual distinction, a concep-
tual distinction is generated through the Cartesian methods of abstrac-
tion and exclusion. If one can consider X in abstraction from Y (and vice
versa), but one cannot exclude, in clear and distinct thought, a consider-
ation of X from a consideration of Y (and vice versa), then X and Y are
merely conceptually distinct: “each attribute includes the other concep-
tually” (1997: 135). There are significant ontological implications when
a conceptual distinction is generated:
Descartes claims that there is merely a rational distinction
between a substance and its attributes, and between the at-
tributes themselves—meaning, as I have argued, that a sub-
stance and each of its attributes (and any two attributes) are
identical in reality. (1997: 138)
In claiming that there is a conceptual distinction between the intel-
lect and the will, Nelson maintains that the intellect and the will are
identical in reality.4 Moreover, the intellect and the will are identical to
mental substance itself. In this sense, the mind is ontologically simple.
However, it is important to distinguish two theses that are not entirely
disambiguated in Nelson’s conceptual reading. First, there is the claim
that the intellect and the will qua faculties of the mind are conceptually
distinct:
FACULTY IDENTITY: The faculty of the intellect, I, and the fac-
ulty of the will, W, are conceptually distinct, and thus I and W are
identical—they are exactly the same mental faculty.
4Nelson does not spell out how he understands identity, but it seems safe to assume
that he has in mind Leibniz’s Law. For an alternative account of Cartesian identity,
one which rejects that Descartes ascribed to Leibniz’s Law, see Morrison (forthcoming)
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As Nelson writes, “Descartes’s treatment in the Fourth Meditation in-
volves a theoretical or rational distinction between will and intellect”
(1997: 174). Faculty Identity, however, must be distinguished from a
related thesis regarding volitions and perceptions qua mental states:
STATE IDENTITY: For any “volition” (distinguished in abstraction),
v, v is conceptually distinct from some “perception” (distinguished in
abstraction), p, i.e. there is one mental state underlying both v and
p.5
The following passage from Nelson shows his committment to State
Identity:
Again, the action and the passion are the same thing. What is
ontologically fundamental is the thinking itself—the think-
ing that constitutes the thinking thing at the time in ques-
tion. We can regard a temporal stretch of thinking as active,
as a volition, while ignoring its passive aspect. Or we can re-
gard it as passive, as an idea, while ignoring its active aspect.
(1997: 173)6
5Interestingly, in Nelson’s analysis of obscure and confused ideas, obscure and con-
fused ideas are a literal fusion of an idea with a false sensory judgment, and it is this
phenomenological conjoining of mental states that generates obscurity and confusion
(1997: 169). Here, it seems that Nelson is implicitly admitting a robust distinction
between ideas and volitions, which generates a tension within his view. There is a
similar worry about an implicit distinction between ideas and volitions in Nelson’s
analysis of innate ideas (Ibid. 164-5). Nonetheless, I contend that State Identity is
a part of Nelson’s final position on the ontology of the Cartesian mind, and it is this
thesis that I will address (not the possible internal inconsistencies within the view).
6Dialectically, however, Nelson’s focus is on State Identity, and it seems that on his
view, Faculty Identity is supposed to follow a fortiori from State Identity. In what
follows, I will not address the relationship that Nelson assumes holds between State
Idenity and Faculty Identity. I will merely raise independent arguments against both
theses.
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At bottom, what motivates Nelson’s committment to both Faculty Iden-
tity and State Identity is his reading of Descartes’ metaphysics of ac-
tivity and passivity in Descartes. On standard readings, the will is the
source of the mind’s activity whereas the intellect is the source of the
mind’s passivity. However, there are a number of texts where, at least
on Nelson’s reading, Descartes claims that there isn’t any robust dis-
tinction between activity and passivity. For example, in the Passions of
the Soul Descartes writes:
For it is certain that we cannot will anything without thereby
perceiving that we are willing it. And although willing some-
thing is an action with respect to our soul, the perception of
such willing may be said to be a passion in the soul. But be-
cause this perception is really one and the same thing as the
volition, and names are always determined by whatever is
most noble, we do not normally call it a ‘passion’, but solely
an ‘action’. (Passions I.19, AT XI: 343/CSM I: 335-336)
For Nelson, any aspect of the mind can be regarded as active or passive
depending on the perspective one takes:
If we regard the interaction with respect to the agent we call
it an action; the very same thing regarded with respect to the
patient will naturally get called a passion. (1997: 173)
As such, activity and passivity are just distinctions in thought, not in
reality. Consequently, the standard modal distinction between both the
faculties of the intellect and the will, and between perceptions and vo-
litions, is false.7
7Nelson and Nolan’s readings are in line with Schickel’s (2011) account of the iden-
tity between action and passion.
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3 The Theory of Error
Descartes famously claims that God is not a deceiver. Within the con-
text of the Fourth Meditation, Descartes is concerned with an epistemic
problem of evil. That is, the problem of subjects forming false judg-
ments, which is a privation—a lack of a perfection—for finite minds. The
thought here is that God cannot be a deceiver in the sense that he is re-
sponsible for our forming false judgments. As is well-known, Descartes’
solution is to claim that the privation of error is generated by the differ-
ing functional scopes between the intellect and the will. The intellect is
finite in scope, in that it can generate a definite set of perceptions (both
clear and distinct and obscure and confused). The will, however, is infi-
nite in scope in that it can operate on any perception (clear and distinct
or obscure and confused) supplied by the intellect. As Descartes writes:
[T]he power of willing which I received from God is not, when
considered in itself, the cause of my mistakes; for it is both ex-
tremely ample and also perfect of its kind. Nor is my power of
understanding to blame; for since my understanding comes
from God, everything that I understand I undoubtedly un-
derstand correctly, and any error here is impossible. So what
then is the source of my mistakes? It must be simply this:
the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but
instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its
use to matters which I do not understand. Since the will is
indifferent in such cases, it easily turns aside from what is
true and good, and this is the source of my error and sin.
(Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 58/CSM I: 40-41)
Error is generated, then, when subjects fail to uphold the so-called “Truth
Rule” and instead affirm obscure and confused perceptions of the intel-
lect:
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TRUTH RULE: A subject, S, ought only affirm their clear and dis-
tinct perceptions.
When subjects do uphold the Truth Rule and only affirm clear and dis-
tinct perceptions, then they will achieve scientia, that is, a true and ab-
solutely certain judgment (Rules, AT X: 362/CSM I: 10; Second Replies,
AT VII: 141/CSM II: 101). While God allows for the possibility of error,
he is not causally responsible for that error obtaining, and thus he is
not a deceiver. Subjects themselves are responsible for generating error
or false judgments, and God is not implicated in that matter.
One of the essential features of Descartes’ epistemic theodicy lies in
the cognitive capacity of the Cartesian mind to suspend judgment, that
is, for the mind to entertain an idea supplied by the intellect without
there being any affirmation by the will. As Descartes claims through-
out the Meditations, the mind has the capacity to “turn my will in com-
pletely the opposite direction” (First Meditation, AT VII: 22/CSM II: 15).
For example, the meditator can intellectually entertain the idea that
the soul is a corporeal entity, without actually making any judgments
about that idea. Significantly, however, this cognitive capacity is limited
only to non-clear and distinct perceptions that is, obscure and confused
perceptions. As Descartes learns in the Fourth Meditation, when the
intellect presents a clear and distinct perception to the will, the will is
compelled to affirm that clear and distinct perception. But in all other
cases of obscure and confused perception, the mind has the capacity to
suspend judgment. Let us call this cognitive capacity Suspension. More
specifically:
SUSPENSION: Whenever a subject, S has an obscure and confused
perception, S’s will has the capacity to suspend all volitional opera-
tions with respect to that perception.
There is a clear tension here: if Nelson is indeed committed to State
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Identity, then State Identity is inconsistent with Suspension. For as
Nelson clearly claims, any stretch of thinking—whether clear or dis-
tinct or obscure and confused—can be regarded as either volitional or
perceptual in abstract thought. And in reality on Nelson’s view, the voli-
tional and perceptual elements of that stretch of thinking are identical.
The problem with accepting State Identity and thereby abandoning
Suspension is that it implicates God as a deceiver in stretches of ob-
scure and confused thought. If obscure and confused thought necessar-
ily involves volitional aspects, that is, affirmation of that obscure and
confused thought, then that means that the Cartesian mind is necessi-
tated to make false judgments due to the very design of the mind. And
those false judgments, strictly speaking, cannot be avoided. While the
Cartesian mind can, in a sense, affirm clear and distinct perceptions
and achieve a state of scientia, whenever the Cartesian mind is out-
side of those special epistemic states, it is always involved in making
false judgments. It seems, then, that State Identity implicates God in
deception.
4 Finite Minds vs. The Infinite Mind
In the Principles, Descartes clearly claims that God is ontologically sim-
ple. There is no divisibility or complexity within the essence of God,
and thus all of the attributes of God are identical to each other. Run-
ning with Nolan and Nelson’s reading of the conceptual distinction it is
clear, then, that there is merely a conceptual distinction between the at-
tributes of God. Some modified version of Faculty Identity, then, must
be true of God: all of the attributes of God are identical to each other.
Notice what Descartes says on this score, as applied to the so-called
“intellect” and “will” of God:
Hence it cannot in any way be supposed that God perceives by
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means of the senses, but only that he understands and wills.
And even his understanding and willing does not happen,
as in our case, by means of operations that are in a certain
sense distinct one from another; we must rather suppose that
there is always a single identical and perfectly simple act by
means of which he simultaneously understands, wills and
accomplishes everything. (Principles I.23, AT VIIIA: 14/CSM
I: 201)
In whatever sense finite minds are ontologically simple, their ontolog-
ically simplicity is not the same as the ontological simplicity of the in-
finite mind, God. In the case of God, God’s intellect and will are iden-
tical. But in the case of finite minds, Descartes draws a contrast here,
claiming that they are, “in a certain sense distinct one from another,”
which certainly indicates that unlike God, Faculty Identity is not true
for finite minds. Descartes gives a clue here as to why the relationship
between the intellect and the will in the infinite mind has to be unlike
the relationship between the intellect and the will in a finite mind.
That clue comes in his remark that “even his understanding and
willing does not happen, as in our case, by means of operations that
are in a certain sense distinct one from another.” In the case of a finite
mind, there is a logical and temporal process to causing a state of affairs.
For example, a finite mind may have a perception of some corporeal
object (say, a piece of cake), which leads to a desire for the cake, which
in turn inclines the will to obtaining the piece of cake through a bodily
action. In short, in the case of finite minds, there are a series of distinct
intellectual, volitional, and passionate steps involved in reaching some
end.
However, in the case of God, Descartes is clear: “there is always a
single identical and perfectly simple act by means of which he simul-
taneously understands, wills and accomplishes everything.” There are
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no processes by which God causes some state of affairs to occur. His
thinking of that state of affairs is identical to his creating that state of
affairs. And that is clearly not the case with finite minds: my thinking
of the cake or desiring the cake in no way automatically leads to my
obtaining the cake. And that is, in part, what it means to be finite.
A further reason for resisting Faculty Identity is due to the differing
degrees of perfection Descartes assigns to the intellect and will (Fourth
Meditation, AT VII: 56-7/CSM II: 39-40. For Descartes, the intellect is
weak, finite, and imperfect in that it cannot perceive and understand
a countless number of things. The will, on the other hand, is perfect in
the “essential and strict sense.” Unlike the intellect, Descartes cannot
conceive of the will being improved upon in any sense: it is “so great
that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp,” and it is that
perfection of the will that makes finite minds bear any resemblance to
God. In short, we see that our passivity and our finitude comes from
the limited capacities of the intellect, and our activity and perfection
comes from the unlimited capacity of the will. But if we are to accept
Faculty Identity, then we are forced into a dilemma: either we say that
since the will is perfect, the intellect must be perfect as well (i.e. is not
limited in its capacity for perception), or we have to say that actually
since the intellect is imperfect, then the will is imperfect as well (i.e.
limited in its capacity to affirm and deny perceptions).
Both options creates problems for Descartes. The first option seems
to shorten the gap between finite and infinite minds. In the Fourth Med-
itation, Descartes claims that in the essential and strict sense, our will
is infinite in nature and identical to God’s will. Thus, if the intellect
is identical to the will, and the will is perfect, finite minds are more
God-like than Descartes can allow. On the other hand, the second op-
tion creates problems for Descartes’ theory of error. If both the intellect
and will are imperfect, then it seems that God has designed us in a way
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such that we are prone to errors of judgment.
5 Generosity, the Will, and the Moral Self
Descartes’ ethical writings also conflict with Faculty Identity and State
Identity. According to Descartes, virtue consists in the firm and con-
stant resolution to use the will well. The virtuous person must resolve
to make her best practical judgments, and act accordingly. She is only
morally responsible for such volitions. This theory of virtue is grounded
in a metaphysics of control and power, according to which the only thing
that is truly within our control is our volitions. The culmination of this
view comes in the Passions, where Descartes offers an account of the
chief passion and virtue in his ethics, namely, generosity. Descartes
writes that generosity has two components:
The first consists in his knowing [connaı̂t] that nothing truly
belongs to him but this freedom to dispose his volitions [qu’il
n’y a rien qui véritablement lui appartienne], and that he
ought to be praised or blamed for no other reason than his
using this freedom well or badly. The second consists in his
feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use
it well—that is, never to lack the will to undertake and carry
out whatever he judges to be best. To do that is to pursue
virtue in a perfect manner. (Passions III.153, AT XI: 445–6/CSM
I: 384)
For our purposes, we can bracket the second component of generosity
(which is a recapitulation of what virtue is) and focus on the first. The
first component of generosity is epistemic: it consists in the knowledge
that the only thing that truly belongs to a subject is her free will. But
within Descartes’ philosophical system, genuine epistemic claims entail
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metaphysical claims. The epistemic claim of the first component of gen-
erosity entails, or at least seems to entail, the following metaphysical
claim: the only thing that truly belongs to a subject, at least considered
morally, is her free will. The first component of generosity has been
cause for much discussion in the literature, and it is still unclear ex-
actly what Descartes meant in claiming that free will is the only thing
that truly belongs to us (Boehm 2014: 718-19, Brown 2006: 25, Mihali
2011, Shapiro 2008: 459). Interestingly, Descartes seems to be claiming
that the Cartesian subject is essentially a res volans, not a res cogitans.
But however you slice the metaphysics of this claim, there is a genuine
interpretive problem with reconciling Faculty Identity with Descartes’
ethics.
Descartes is clearly claiming that free will is privileged within the
metaphysics of the mind, and that moral subjects must identify them-
selves with their volitional nature. As mentioned earlier, part of the mo-
tivation for this claim is that subjects must distinguish between what
they can control and what they cannot control, and in realizing that,
they will be able to understand the source of legitimate self-esteem,
praise, and blame which is essential to securing Cartesian virtue and
happiness:
I see only one thing in us which could give us good reason for
esteeming ourselves, namely, the exercise of our free will and
the control we have over our volitions. For we can reasonably
be praised or blamed only for actions that depend upon this
free will. It renders us in a certain way like God by making
us masters of ourselves, provided we do not lose the rights it
gives us through timidity. (Passions III.152, AT XI: 445/CSM
I: 384)
The only thing that is truly within our control is the freedom to dispose
of our volitions. Everything else, from our intellectual capacities to our
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corporeal and historical circumstances, are ultimately outside of our
control. The moral agent must realize that regardless of her perceptual
and bodily limitations, she must use her will as well as she can, and in
doing so, she will be able to realize virtue (the firm and constant resolu-
tion to use the will well) and thereby attain happiness or contentment
of mind.
But if Faculty Identity and State Identity is true, then the sphere
of control and the metaphysics of power within the Cartesian mind dis-
sipates. On the conceptual reading, the intellect is identical to the will
and every volition is a perception and every perception is a volition.
Thus, what sense can be made of the will alone truly belonging to us,
and of using that will alone, as best as one can, in response to one’s lim-
ited perceptions? For if one’s perceptions just are one’s volitions, then
the thought of volitionally operating on one’s perceptions, as best as one
can, loses its force. Perhaps more importantly for ethical matters, the
thought that one ought not base one’s self-esteem on passive percep-
tions, and that one cannot be praised or blamed for one’s passivity that
lies outside the purview of the will, seems to lose its force.
In short, we do need some kind of robust distinction between the
intellect and the will in order to get Descartes’ ethics off the ground. The
modal reading, of course, has no problems here. Perhaps the conceptual
reading has a story to tell as well, but that story is needed if we want a
systematic and consistent interpretation of Descartes’ system.
6 Conclusion
I have tried to raise a number of problems for the conceptual reading.
To be sure, I do not take any of these to be knock-down arguments. But
they are serious concerns that must be addressed, if we are to abandon
the modal reading. In closing, I would like to briefly discuss a broader
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issue concerning Cartesian simplicity.
To start, I am unclear exactly what ‘simplicity’ means for Nelson in
Cartesian metaphysics. Thus I am unclear about what exactly we are
trying to establish in explaining this allegedly fundamental aspect of
the ontology of the Cartesian mind, and why there would be a need in
the first place to collapse the distinction between the intellect and the
will.
Perhaps a way forward is to establish what the opposite of simplicity
might be. The opposite of simplicity must be either divisibility or com-
plexity. However, I am not sure if divisibility and complexity are exactly
the same thing. Of course, Descartes will claim that it is essential to
the mind that it is indivisible: the mind cannot be split up into parts.
Divisibility, the thought goes, is part of the essential nature of res ex-
tensa. As such, Perhaps Nelson is trying to establish the indivisibility
(i.e. simplicity) of the mind in showing that the intellect and the will are
identical. For if the intellect and will are distinct, he seems to assume,
then Descartes is countenancing parts of the mind.
Indeed, Descartes does have a resistance to an Aristotelian or Pla-
tonic faculty psychology, according to which each faculty is a different
“part of the soul.” But Descartes’ metaphysics is different than Aristo-
tle and Plato’s, and thus I do not see why Descartes cannot maintain
a genuine modal distinction between the intellect and the will, where
the intellect and the will are different properties or modes of the mind,
without making the mind divisible into parts. As Wagner has clarified:
His talk of mental faculties and capacities in the third and
fourth Meditations is clearly, and rightly, not considered to
suggest the mind’s divisibility in any sense. Faculties are one
thing, parts another. Nor is there an obvious reason why hav-
ing faculties must entail being a system of parts, however
natural Aristotle (and others) might find that idea. What
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Descartes cannot admit, however, is that various kinds of
thinking should be delegated to the faculties. Cartesian fac-
ulties are never more than capacities or attributes of a think-
ing thing. They themselves do not think. In contrast, Aris-
totle treats the faculties substantially. They perceive, will,
or understand; by Descartes’s definitions therefore, they are
minds. (1984: 57)
The point here, then, is that if by simplicity we mean indivisibility, it’s
still not clear why we would have to apply a conceptual distinction to the
intellect and the will to secure the ontological simplicity of the mind.
Let me now turn to complexity. It is simply clear that the Carte-
sian mind is complex. There are a variety of token ideas, passions, judg-
ments, sensations, and so forth all occurring within the Cartesian mind,
and within a temporal order. Thus, if the mind is indivisible, it can still
be rich with a variety of attributes and modes. As such, ‘complexity’
cannot be straightforwardly interchangeable with ‘divisibility’ in the
Cartesian metaphysics of the mind. The motivation for the conceptual
reading, then, cannot be ridding the mind of complexity.
But now notice that when we turn to the metaphysics of God, and
start thinking about what is inadmissible within God’s nature, we find
a contrast. While it is true that like finite minds, God is indivisible, un-
like finite minds God cannot be complex in any sense. Plausibily, meta-
physical complexity requires an external cause for the complexity, and
God is self-caused or the necessary existent. There is nothing outside
of God that is causally responsible for the existence of a variety of at-
tributes within God’s essence. Here, then, we find a clear and persuasive
motivation for applying a conceptual distinction between all alleged “as-
pects”, “attributes,” or “properties” of God. As we saw in the Principles,
Descartes clearly claims that God’s understanding, will, and power are
all identical to each other. Thus, when thinking about the ontological
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simplicity of God, and what we mean by ‘divine simplicity’, it seems
that for Descartes, God’s simplicity is his unity: in being one entity in
the strictest sense, there is no divisibility or complexity within God.
But if God is simple or unified in that sense, finite minds cannot
be simple in that sense at all. They have to be simple in an entirely
different sense. Perhaps the simplicity of the mind is reducible to the
innocuous claim that the essence of the mind or its principle attribute is
just thought (Principles I.53 AT VIIIA: 25/CSM I: 210-211) . But that is
compatible in Descartes’ metaphysics of the mind with thought having
various attributes and modes. The upshot, perhaps, is this: the concep-
tual distinction, as applied to God, entails identity between all of God’s
attributes. However, when applied to finite minds, we need to take the
Hoffman (2002) style reading of the conceptual distinction: the intellect
and will are conceptually distinct in virtue of being inseparable. Yet they
are still distinct. There are two different applications of the conceptual
distinction in Descartes’ metaphysics.
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